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Introduction  
Access to water is a major challenge in the upper part of the Limpopo basin in Mozambique, as there 
are no permanent rivers except for the Elephants River, whose flow is regulated by the Massingir 
Dam. Even the Limpopo River can dry up between October and December due to upstream uptake 
and international management. In the opinions of the technicians, the seven districts of the semi-arid 
part of the Limpopo basin – from the Gaza and Inhambane province - are among the worst 
Mozambican districts for borehole development because of the great depth of the groundwater, the 
high risk of obtaining salty water and high drilling costs (MOPH/DNA, 2009). With an average 
borehole cost of US$23 810, drilling in the Gaza province is 200% above the national average (Zita & 
Naafs, 2012).  
To boost rural water coverage at national level, the National Directorate of Water [DNA Direcção 
Nacional de Águas] has adopted the demand-response approach which is currently recommended 
for rural water supplies in many developing countries (Jiménez & Pérez-Foguet, 2010). The aim of the 
rural water sector was to shift from the traditional focus on building new facilities to setting up 
institutional and management structures that are able to maintain the facilities and ensure a long-
term water supply. The main instrument was implementation of the National Rural Water Supply and 
Sanitation Program (NRWSSP), or PRONASAR (Programa Nacional de Abastecimento de Água e 
Saneamento Rural), which was launched in 2010. The program defines itself as “the framework for 
operationalizing and implementing the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Strategic Plan (PESA-ASR) 
2006-2015 to reach the Millennium Development Goal of 70% coverage for rural water supply and 50% 
coverage for rural sanitation at national level, respectively”. This implies the provision of 17 000 new 
or rehabilitated water points and 151 small rural systems – or motorized water system including 
treatment and taps - (MOPH/DNA 2009) 
The PRONASAR program follows the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). This declaration 
recommends helping the governments of developing countries to formulate and implement their 
own national development plans, according to their own national priorities, using, wherever possible, 
their own planning and implementation systems. In Mozambique a number of donors (Canada, the 
Netherlands, UNICEF, Switzerland, the UK and the African Development Bank) created a common 
fund for rural water supply and sanitation. The program has four components (1) Support for a 
sustainable increase in rural water supply and sanitation coverage; (2) Development of appropriate 
technologies and management models for the Rural Water and Sanitation sub-sector (RWSS); (3) 
Capacity building and human resource development in the RWSS; (4) Support for decentralized 
planning, management, monitoring and financing of RWSS, with a focus on  “inclusive, bottom-up 
planning, improving the accuracy, completeness and communication of information for planning, 
budgeting and managing rural water and sanitation”. In particular, the districts were nominated as 
the focal point for planning, implementation and monitoring of the Program (drilling and 
“Participation and Community Education” or PEC), while the provincial level was made responsible 
for drawing up and managing most contracts. The program also emphasizes the sustainability of 
water infrastructure through the direct involvement of the communities concerned, capacity building, 
institutional development, as well as the development of value chains for spare parts. In addition to 
correcting the discrepancies in water coverage between districts and provinces it also aimed to build 
capacity in the WASH (Water Sanitation and Hygiene promotion) sector at local level.   
The program also promotes complementary cross-cutting approaches such as poverty alleviation, 
good governance and gender equity. It thus explicitly includes a participatory dimension and aims to 
facilitate the inclusion of the most vulnerable groups. Monitoring is based on indicators related to 
poverty alleviation such as the incidence of poverty in a village (estimated by the % of poor 
households), the percentage of water sources maintained by communities with pro-poor 
management rules and regulations, and the percentage of poor areas and households with access to 
water and sanitation.  The pro-poor approach also includes the prioritization of districts and district 
areas with low coverage and high poverty. The active participation of women is also promoted. Other 
recommendations mention the need to use participatory district planning methods and to involve 
the consultative councils as well as the traditional systems of social support to reach the most 
vulnerable groups (MOPH/DNA 2009). Concomitantly with the development of the program, the 
national norms defining quality of service were redefined: in rural area, adequate service is now 
defined as a “protected dug well equipped with a hand pump, serving 300 people (about 60 families) 
within a 500 meter radius (including 30 minutes’ walk back and forth and queuing time)”, whereas 
the norm used to be 500 people (around 100 households) for each water point used. The level of 
salinity of potable water should not exceed 2500 µS/cm (Pendly & Obiols, 2013).  
The PRONASAR program is thus fully aligned with the strategic orientation defined by the PARPs: It 
supports administrative de-concentration/decentralization by strengthening the role of provincial 
and district government and explicitly addresses poverty alleviation through the development of 
infrastructures. To what extent does it succeed in addressing social and territorial inequality related 
to water access?  The aim of this study was to investigate how the modalities of implementation of 
the program, particularly the interactions between the main actors, have impacted the outcomes of 
the program in terms of social and territorial equity in access to water. We argue that although the 
program enabled a real increase in the number of small water infrastructures (SWI) -  an important 
outcome in this water deprived area -  the strategies and the pattern of relationships between the 
main actors (technicians belonging to the provincial and district administration, the consulting firms 
in charge of drilling boreholes, drilling supervision, and PEC, as well as community leaders and water 
users) to face the challenges that prevail in the area led to tensions that could jeopardize the 
sustainability of the infrastructure. Our analysis underlines the need to better account for the 
relationship patterns that shape local implementation pathways, as well as the need to focus as 
much on the quality of the implementation process as on the technical and economic efficiency of 
the program.  
Methodology  
Water access in Mabalane district, Northern Gaza province 
This study was conducted in the district of Mabalane, one of the five districts of the Gaza Province 
selected for the pilot phase of the PRONASAR where 30 boreholes were scheduled for a three year 
period (2011-2013). Mabalane is a little populated and mostly agro-pastoral district located in the 
Upper Limpopo basin in Mozambique. The 5,400 families in the district belong to three 
administrative posts (APs):  Mabalane-Sede (42%), Combomune (30%) and Ntlavene (28%) of the 
population. Each AP is divided into localities that group different villages and communities. Two 
thirds of the communities and population are located in the riverine area along the Limpopo river.  
The left side of the river is part of the buffer zone of the Limpopo National Park (LNP). 
With 72% of its population living below the poverty line, according to official ranking based on 
nutrition, food security and access to public good indicators, Mabalane is part of the 4th quartile of 
the poorest districts of Mozambique. It is also the third most problematic district of the Gaza 
province in terms of the nutrition index, with chronic malnutrition higher than the national average. 
The poverty situation is better in the southern part of the district (55% of poverty in Mabalane-Sede 
AP) but is 80% in Combumune and 88%  in Ntlavene APs (PEDD Mabalane, 2010).   
Access and transport are really problematic: although the southern part of the district is only 50 
kilometers away from the Macarettane bridge (and the Chókwè paved road), in 2012, none of the 
439 km network of district roads was paved, and until November 2013, the closest gas station was in 
Chókwè, 100 kilometers away. Although the situation is expected to improve when the road to the 
Zimbabwe border is finished in 2015, the LNP buffer zone is currently only directly accessible by car 
from the district center three months a year or via a 300 km detour (two thirds of which are not 
paved).   
The district can be divided into different areas based on their geo-hydromorphology, accessibility, 
distance to the main market, and institutional organization. In this paper, we distinguish between (1) 
the two rural centers of Mabalane-Sede (the administrative center of the district) and Combomune-
Estação, located on the main road and railroad track that runs some 10 to 25 km away from the river. 
Both rural centers still play an important role in operating the railroad connecting Maputo to the 
Zimbabwe border; (2) the riverine villages on the right margin of the Limpopo River that have access 
to the river water and alluvial river terraces; (3) riverine villages on the left margin of the buffer zone 
of the LNP, which are constrained by LNP regulations and access issues; and (4) the villages on the 
plateau, which have no access to superficial water. All the water bodies in this area have an 
ephemeral regime that enables a few small reservoirs to be filled, but none are permanent. 
There are three main sources of water in the district: the Limpopo river and its alluvial waters (during 
the dry season), which are accessible to riverine communities; the water stored in the small 
temporary reservoirs; groundwater, whose access is restricted since the water table is generally very 
deep (between 50 m and 80 m) and which is of poor quality for geological reasons (CSIR, 2003; FAO, 
2004). Prior to the PRONASAR project, the district claimed 56 boreholes, 15 small water systems 
(SWS) that pumped groundwater or surface water from the River Limpopo, and 17 small temporary 
reservoirs. Officially, 25% of the boreholes were not operational, i.e. more than the 20% national 
average (MOPH/DNA, 2013; Munguambe & Langa de Jesus, 2011). The actual number of functioning 
water points is subject to debate:  during a partial census undertaken in 2012 in the riverine villages 
in the right margin area, 12 out of the 36 water points (WP) were found to be out of order (33%) 
while internal documents belonging to the District Service for Planning and Infrastructure or SDPI 
(Serviço Distrital de Planeamento e Infrastructuras) – in charge of water and sanitation at district 
level -  reported 31% of non-functioning boreholes;   
Most of these boreholes and SWS were created in the last 15 years as part of projects and 
interventions managed by different NGOs (World Relief, LWF, CARITAS and PROMUJE), either as post 
war reintegration operations and/or post-flood or drought relief support. Although each NGO had its 
own strategy in terms of community mobilization and organization, most included the creation of a 
water committee and the payment of a water fee for the maintenance of the WP. In all the villages 
we visited, a water committee still existed although its composition varied from one village to the 
other. Generally, one inhabitant of the village was also in charge of the regular maintenance of the 
hand pump.  
An approach combining qualitative public policy analysis with a quantitative survey at 
village level 
We used a three-step approach to analyze the way the PRONASAR program was being implemented: 
We first characterized the institutional framework through a review of the literature and interviews 
key national actors. We then investigated local implementation using a public policy analysis (PPA) 
approach, to identify and analyze the gap between the official declarations and what was really 
happening, as evidenced by the actors’ practices.  PPA makes it possible to describe the “state at 
work” or the “politics from below” and focuses on different levels of governance. This is critical in 
developing countries where the influence of international norms is high. It emphasizes the need to 
consider the broader context both historically and horizontally (interactions across policy sectors) 
and vertically (multi-level interactions). It analyzes the different formal and informal institutional and 
policy arrangements around which both public and non-public actors interacted in the 
implementation of the program as well as some unexpected interactions between different policy 
sectors.   
To this end, we interviewed different members of the district government and administration 
(administrator, district permanent secretary, administrative staff and some local post chiefs) as well 
as the head of district services (water, planning, social services, agriculture) and district, provincial 
and national technicians. Between November and December 2012, we investigated water use, access 
to water and water management in 12 communities in the different areas of the district. The village 
survey included (i) an interview with leaders; (ii) focus groups with water committee members; (iii) 
focus groups with women in two villages; (iv) a transect walk and a visit to village SWI accompanied 
by member(s) of the water committee. We also conducted a quantitative survey comprising a total of 
119 interviews in three of these villages to analyze water use and the local perception of access to 
water and of how the water committee functioned.  
The villages to visit were selected using information on water points and population that was 
available at district level. There were some discrepancies in the names of villages and communities as 
well as in the number of households per community in the different district documents. The number 
of households of a couple of communities could not be found in the document we consulted. We 
used SDPI quantitative data to analyze PRONASAR achievements but we did not have access to the 
final PRONASAR database (which was not yet available at the time we conducted our field surveys). 
Field work enabled us to identify some errors in the SDPI data concerning the number of operational 
boreholes and/or the number or families in one or two of the villages we visited, most likely due to 
confusion in the names of the villages or differences in the statements made by the leaders. The 
errors were corrected whenever possible.   
Results 
An improvement in access to water but difficulties still remain in a challenging 
hydrogeological context  
The drilling of 30 boreholes and rehabilitation of seven others represents a 52% increase in 
functioning WPs in the district, a significant outcome in this water deprived district. According to the 
SDPI data, the number of households supplied by each water point decreased from an average of 256 
households per operational water point (Op WP) to 133 households/Op WP except in Mabalane-
Sede where the contractor was unable to finish a small water system in the time frame specified for 
the intervention (Table 1). Thus although, according to the national definition of water access, the 
situation has improved, the number of households to use one well is still considerably higher than 
the national standard for good service. With more than 300 households/Op WP, the situation of the 
two vilas (or rural centers) is in even worse than that of rural villages. The villages located in the LNP 
buffer zone appeared to be less well supplied than villages in other areas, while villages located in 
plateau areas villages were generally better supplied than others.  
TABLE 1: CHANGES IN SOME WATER ACCESS INDICATORS IN MABALANE  
 Prior to PRONASAR 
intervention 
Post PRONASAR intervention  
 
% 
households
/op wp 
%   
op wp / 
village 
Nb op 
Wp 
%  
op wp / total 
% 
households 
/op wp 
%  
 op wp / 
village 
Vilas* 1 120 1,0 7 9% 320 3,5 
Villages near the river  167 1,0 17 21% 118 1,4 
Other river villages 203 1,1 19 23% 96 2,4 
Villages on the plateau  158 0,5 21 26% 83 1,0 
Villages in buffer zone  368 0,4 17 21% 173 0,8 
TOTAL 256 0,7 81 100% 133 1,3 
* Mabalane-sede and Combumume-Estação. **wp: water points (boreholes, small water systems) not including reservoirs and 
wells; op wp: operational water points” 
source: CPWF study  using Mabalane PRONASAR data, 
 
Comparison with the situation prior to the intervention showed that PRONASAR had led to partial 
improvement of previous spatial inequalities. This improvement was particularly noticeable in the 
villages located in the northern part of the district (Combomune AP) where 50% of the new 
boreholes were drilled.  
Access to water access was indeed clearly unequitable prior to the intervention (Table 1). There was 
no operational water system in Mabalane-Sede and five small-systems in the other railroad vila 
(Combumune-Estação). Villages located on the right margin in the surrounding of Mabalane-Sede or 
in the southern part of the district (closer to the paved road and city center of Chókwè) were better 
equipped than villages located in other areas particularly those in the plateau area or in the PNL 
buffer zone. These data confirmed the overall impression we had of inequitable development when 
we visited the district with more developed riverine villages in the southern part of the district.  
The initial unequal distribution of water points in the district resulted from the traditional 
mechanisms of village selection for interventions, which were based on ease of access and/or 
interference by politicians. 
Like in other countries (Booth & Cammack, 2013), the functioning of state services has been shaped 
by external aid and projects. For example, in PRONASAR, newly purchased project automobiles were 
mostly allocated to the department chief and only made available for field work when no there were 
no other priorities. While field stipends encouraged agents to undertake field and monitoring 
activities, the bad state of the road, the distance and logistical challenges make it difficult to cover 
the territory equally. Although some areas, such as the PNL buffer zone, are clearly far more difficult 
to reach and develop, state agents often used poor access as an excuse to avoid trying to visit these 
areas especially when little time was available for the visit, as underlined in different reports. The 
preference for proximity was not only a matter of ease of access but also the consequence of normal 
social functioning. Technicians who are located in the main vilas naturally develop stronger social ties 
in the area in which they live and may be tempted to prefer their connections. For example, it was 
obvious that the residents of the vilas of Mabalane and Combomune Estação had been favored by 
the technical services in the post-flood seed distribution scheme (Ducrot, 2013).  
Ease of access was also a key determinant in the selection of the villages visited by high level 
politicians (provincial or national representatives) (comicio popular) or representatives of donors 
who have little time to devote to every area they visit. Consequently villages located near the paved 
road (in the southern part of the district for Mabalane) or close to the district center, were the target 
of more of these kinds of visits than average. During these visits, promises were often made, which 
the district government attempted to keep. The interaction between these mechanisms created a 
vicious circle of investments in certain communities to the detriment of others, while the 
investments justified further visits to the same “pilot” sites.  
This vicious circle is perpetrated by a project functioning that stresses the need for outcomes in a 
short term project timeframe, as these outcomes are measured by concrete indicators (the number 
of boreholes drilled or water committees created in a two to three year project, for example). To be 
sure they would be able to achieve these objectives, the technicians told us they often favored area, 
villages, or populations where success would be easy to achieve, although they tried to balance this 
choice with the choice of one or two more difficult targets. In the case of the PRONASAR intervention, 
we did not hear a coherent record of how the initial selection of districts was made; but all the 
narratives agreed that the initial selection of districts did not include the most distant and 
challenging districts of the Upper Limpopo area and that a new selection was done later on. Even so, 
a couple of more? easily? accessible districts were intentionally kept in the portfolio to be sure to be 
able to show results at the end of the pilot phase (source: interview with Provincial DPOH agent).    
It is only fair to point out that in recent years, the district government has been striving to promote 
more balanced development by encouraging NGO projects or external interventions in the 
underdeveloped areas of the district, particularly in the PNL buffer zone. PRONASAR data shows that 
adjustments have indeed been made. Yet these encouraging statistics mask two main difficulties.  
The first difficulty is that some villages still do not have access to safe water whereas other villages 
appear to be very well supplied (Table2).  
TABLE 2:  PERCENTAGE OF VILLAGES AND HOUSEHOLDS LACKING ACCESS TO WATER BY AP 
 
AP 
   Locality 
Nb 
com 
Total nb 
house-
hold (HH)  
Com. 
without 
op wp 
nb of HH 
without 
op wp 
% com. 
without 
op wp 
% HH 
without 
op wp 
Mabalane sede       
 Vila  1 1374 0    
 Rural Mabalane (plateau and 
riverine) 
4 315 4 315* 100% 100% 
 Nhatimba (plateau) 11 781 5 227*** 45% 29% # 
 Tsocate (south riverine) 8 1690 2 35* 25% 2% # 
Combumune       
 vila  1 1180 0  0%  
 Com. Estação  rural  (Plateau area) 9 955 3 332 33% 35% 
 Comb rio (riverine area) 14 2110 2 161** 14% 8% # 
Ntlavene       
 Chipswane (riverine) 4 1002 0  0%  
 Ntlavene (Riverine LMP buffer zone) 12 1656 5 645* 42% 39% # 
Number of households estimated using data available in district documents. The number of * indicates the 
number of communities where information on households was missing. # indicates that this number is 
probably (slightly) underestimated due to the lack of information concerning households.   
The second difficulty is the high level of salinity of many of the boreholes. Access to water in the Gaza 
province, especially in the northern part of the province is limited by salinity (CSIR, 2003). If the 
national norm had been strictly respected, only 15 of the 30 boreholes would have been drilled 
during the PRONASAR intervention. The average salinity of the boreholes that were drilled was 2 650 
µS/cm and the salinity level of 50% of the boreholes was above the national norm 2 500 µS/cm. This 
is particularly true of two Administrative Posts (Mabalane-Sede and Ntlavene). Non-saline 
groundwater proved easier to reach in the Combumune AP in both the villages on the plateau and 
along the river than in other areas. Because of the salinity problem, the district government and 
technicians decided to use a 5000 µS/cm threshold instead of the 2500 µS/cm national norm to 
enable 30 boreholes to be drilled.  
This decision was in line with the perceptions of the users we recorded during our individual 
interviews. Some users would rather have access to a (slightly) saline borehole than to have no WP 
nearby, as this often meant sharing water with animals and drinking muddy water and/or walking 20 
km to fetch drinkable water. On the other hand, the level of salinity determined both water uses and 
the maintenance of boreholes. In villages where different water sources were available, the 
population were only willing to keep the borehole operational if no other source of less saline water 
was identified in the vicinity. When only a saline borehole was available in the village, users who 
could afford it (in terms of transport and time) preferred to fetch drinking water from the river 
(Ducrot, 2013).   
The PRONASAR program specified that newly drilled boreholes whose salinity level was above the 
acceptable threshold were not to be finalized, but the contractor was paid according to the number 
of boreholes he equipped. In the local context, a decision not to finish a “positive” drilling point 
(when water was found during drilling) led to frustration, misunderstandings, and local tensions. It 
was all the more difficult because in some places initial tests of groundwater salinity were adequate 
but the level of salinity had increased a couple of weeks later which prevented the borehole from 
being equipped. These tensions and frustration were evidence of the communication problem 
between communities and technicians. They were not limited to the decision on whether or not 
equip boreholes, but also concerned the choice of village, the location of the borehole, and the 
choice of technology. To understand these tensions and their impact, we need to analyze the 
relationships between the main actors during the implementation process.  
The different actors involved in implementation  
Table 3 lists the stakeholders involved in the development and implementation of the program. As 
stated in the official PRONASAR document “The National Directorate of Water (DNA) is responsible 
for implementing the Program at central level. The Provincial Directorates of Public Works and 
Housing (DPOPH), through The Department of Water and Sanitation (DAS), is responsible for 
implementing the Program at provincial level. At district level, district governments through the units 
responsible for rural water supply, sanitation, community mobilization and health promotion (or SDPI 
– District Service for Infrastructures) will be responsible for implementing Program activities. At local 
level, Community Water Supply and Sanitation Committees composed of village residents are formed 
and supported to assist in planning and to manage, maintain and monitor improved water supply and 
sanitation facilities” (MPOH/DNA 2009). The overall design was the responsibility of a steering 
committee made up of representatives of donors and the Mozambican government 
The actors involved in program implementation are summarized in table 3 and figure 1 below. 
Provincial services were in charge of the financial management of the program, procurement, 
monitoring and contracts. Three contractors were concerned: first the contractor in charge of drilling? 
who drilled the boreholes, second the contractor in charge of the social dimension of SWI 
development including sanitary education called ‘Participation and Community Education’ - 
Participação e Educação Comunitária (PEC) – and third, the contractor who supervised drilling. The 
district technical services were in charge of the overall monitoring of the intervention and of 
organizing coordination at local level. The supervisor in charge of monitoring and evaluation of PEC 
was based in a SDPI office in Mabalane, but the coordinator was based in Maputo. The PEC 
contractor also had a technician (called a community activist) in each Administrative Post to develop 
work at community level. NGOs already intervening at village level were also supposed to be coopted 
and mobilized to facilitate dissemination and community participation. In practice, the NGO agents 
we contacted did not report having been involved in any cooperation or coordination.     
The program supported DPOH technical services by hiring supplementary staff for the program and a 
technical assistant. A technician was also contracted at district level who subsequently became a 
permanent member of the SDPI staff in charge of both WASH and environmental issues for the 
district. Other support included equipment (computers, cars and motorcycles) both at provincial and 
district level and training not only in technical aspects but also in administrative tasks such as 
contracting or fund raising using the newly implemented SISTAF software.  
At community and village levels, the program called on village leaders, existing or newly created 
water committees, as well as the locality, administrative post and district consultative councils.  
 
TABLE 3: ACTORS IN THE PRONASAR PROGRAM 
Level Administration Contractor Civil society 
National 
• Steering Committee 
• PRONASAR 
technicians @ DNA 
(including technical 
assistance) 
• One contractor for 
Mabalane SWS 
 
Provincial 
• Civil servants (DPOH) 
• Supplementary staff 
• Technical assistant 
(@ DPOH) 
• Drilling contractor 
• PEC contractor 
(coordinator based in 
Maputo) 
• Work  monitoring contractor 
 
District 
• 1 technician who 
subsequently joined 
the SDPI staff 
• PEC district supervisor 
• Drilling team  
• Monitoring team 
• Consultative 
councils 
• Craftsmen 
Administrative 
Post 
 • PEC technicians • Consultative 
councils 
• NGO technicians 
Village 
  • Water committee 
• Village leaders 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACTORS IN THE PRONASAR PROGRAM 
 
Local consultative councils1  are institutionalized through the Lei dos Orgões Locais do Estado2 (LOLE) 
approved in 2003 (Law 8/2003 and Decree 11/2005). By law, these councils are made up of coopted 
members from the state administration (health, education, and district government), organized civil 
society, and members of the village and local economic elite. They are to be involved in the process 
of drawing up and approving the district plans. They also are involved in the selection of projects that 
are submitted to the District Development Fund. In Mabalane, these councils are fully functional: 
they meet on a regular basis, holding two normal district and administrative post council meetings 
per year for the approval of the district annual budget and for the planning and assessment of the 
activities, as well as for the selection of FDD projects. A number of extraordinary council meetings 
are also organized, particularly at district level. The minutes of the district and AP meetings are 
available. 
For the administration, these leaders represent the communities and form the link between the 
communities and the administration. At local level, the administration is represented by a civil 
servant appointed by the government or “chief of a locality” (Chefe de Localidade).  The chief resides 
in a village in a locality that “controls” various communities. All the communities in a locality elect a 
“1st level leader” (lider de primeiro escalão) to represent them at the level of the locality. At the 
village or community level, a 2nd level leader is elected to represent the population of the village. 
New elections can be held if the leaders choose to resign (to migrate for example) or if they die, but 
no regular reelections are held. The communities also have a traditional leader who inherits his 
responsibilities and is in charge of traditional ceremonies and land allocation. He generally holds the 
title of 3rd level leader (lider de terceiro escalão). Each leader has his own team of advisors. Other 
people with responsibility in the village include the block and sub-block chief- whose function used to 
be linked with the party -  and the community police. The Frelimo party also has its own local 
representation and membership.  Ad hoc committees are sometimes created to manage certain 
types of infrastructure such as boreholes or irrigation scheme  usually in response to a request from 
external actors such as NGOs. This is the case of the water committees in charge of the management 
of WP, which includes maintenance and the collection of water fees.  
Actors’ relationships and program development and implementation  
The relationships between provincial and district technical services 
For most state agents, both provincial and district, the objectives of the program were limited to its 
bureaucratic or administrative dimensions such as providing equipment (computers, cars etc.), as 
well as funds for administration and training. This contribution should not be overlooked since the 
annual SDPI budget – including all activities, i.e. roads, transport, water and sanitation but not  
including salaries - was less than US$11 500 (Mabalane Pesod 2012).  The information we gathered in 
interviews underlined the fact that provincial staff were operational and that effective learning 
concerning contract management did take place. But in general, administrative personnel showed 
little change in their attitude and mainly emphasized the need to respect the terms of the contract 
and the overall hierarchical relationships between the technical services.   
                                                          
1 Different names in Portuguese: Conselhos Locais (Local Councils), Conselhos Consultativos (Consultative Councils), Instituições de 
Participação e Consulta Comunitária (Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation)  
2 Law on Local State Bodies 
District level staff were mostly involved in monitoring the work carried out by the contractors. They 
did not contribute to the definition of the contracts and their ability to adapt the intervention to the 
local context was limited, except for accepting a new salinity threshold. Logically they tended to 
focus more on respecting the indicators (number of committees formed or number of meetings held 
etc.) rather than on the philosophy behind the program.  Information was perceived as a demand 
from the provincial (or national) level, not as a basis for their daily work and/or decision making. For 
example, it is remarkable that none of the many indicators collected by the PEC contractor in the 
communities was available at district level and when they were available, they included errors. Thus 
if the program reinforced the provincial level, it also reinforced the hierarchy between the provincial 
and district levels.   .  
The relationships between contractors and technical services  
Project implementation relied on contractual relationships between the provincial administration 
and private contractors. To ensure technical and economic efficiency, contractors are paid based on 
their achievements measured using clear quantitative indicators: the number of equipped boreholes 
for the drilling contractors and indicators such as the percentage of water committees established 
for the management of newly created boreholes or the percentage of pre-existing water committees 
revitalized and active in relation with the PEC contractors.  This contractual relationship strictly 
limited any possible adaptation or flexibility, which proved to be a problem as the challenging local 
specificities had not been taken into account in the design of the contract.  In addition, the 
contractual relationships between the administration and two main contractors turned out to be 
conflictual.  
The first drilling contractor selected appeared to have underestimated the challenges of boreholes 
drilling in Mabalane due to difficult access and logistical and hydrogeological problems. In the first 
year, he only managed to drill three boreholes (none of which had been equipped by the end of the 
first year).  His contract was consequently revoked and a new contractor selected (a Chinese 
consulting firm). The contractor of the Mabalane-Sede SWS was faced with the same kinds of 
difficulties and after two years without significant advances, his contract was rescinded in 2013 and 
the same Chinese engineering firm was selected to finish the work that had begun two years earlier. 
There were also delays in the finalization and operationalization of the PEC contract for reasons that 
remain unclear, meaning that work starting extremely slowly and there was little coordination 
between the drilling and the PEC contractors. This lack of coordination made it easy for the 
contractors to focus on their individual agenda. The technically efficient Chinese firm was interested 
in finishing the job as rapidly as possible for two reasons: they were supposed to do a job in two 
years that was initially scheduled over a period of three years. They also wanted to free up the 
equipment being used in Mabalane as rapidly as possible to complete another contractual 
engagement. Consequently the social intervention in the field was not satisfactorily synchronized 
with the technical dimension of the program, which increased the communication problems and 
hence the communities’ frustration.   
Conflicts between the administration and infrastructure contractors are common in Mozambique 
and are frequently reported in the media and in reports (CIP, 2009; CIP & LMDH, 2011, 2012). It is 
not rare for contractors to be prosecuted for failure to fulfil their contract: for example the DPOH is 
currently prosecuting a contractor for failing to respect technical norms in the rehabilitation of a 
reservoir in Mabalane. The difficulties are exacerbated in districts like Mabalane where difficult 
access, distance and logistic challenges increase intrinsic technical difficulties (in this case 
hydrogeology). An engineering firm needs a solid logistic and financial background to be able to 
overcome such difficulties. But the problems were not only due to unsatisfactory selection of 
contractors: The very first PRONASAR contract had to be cancelled due to the inexperience of the 
provincial team who dealt with the contract, which led to administrative irregularities.  
Monitoring the intervention emphasized efficiency by focusing on measurable quantitative indicators. 
However, although such indicators are important in monitoring progress during the implementation 
phase, they do not account for the quality of the participatory work undertaken or for the long term 
service delivery  (e.g. reliability and continuity of water services) (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). Our field 
visits revealed that participatory activities were often only superficial and that the indicators did not 
account for the real situation at village level. It was difficult for the PRONASAR SDPI technician in 
charge of all issues related to water, sanitation, and the environment in the district, to be available to 
supervise the works undertaken by the PEC contractors while at the same time fulfilling his different 
administrative duties and responding to requests from the district and visitors (including for the 
present study!) and the technical work received most of his attention.   
The relationships between technical actors and communities 
On paper, the relationships between the technical actors and the communities were straightforward: 
The community selection procedure assumed the formalization of a request by a community that 
would include the selection of “priority areas, show a clear communities’ willingness and capacity to 
participate and contribute to the improvement of their water and sanitation service including up-front 
contribution in cash or in kind, formation of a water and sanitation committee, payment of full 
operation and maintenance costs” (MPOH/DNA 2009). Selection was to be based on a ‘first come 
first served’ basis. The PEC contractor was in charge of organizing community mobilization, requests, 
and the water committee. The contractor was also in charge of transmitting the approved request to 
the technical contractor. The community was then expected to suggest and clear three possible sites 
where the technical contractor could explore water availability. Community selection was not clear:  
On one hand the procedure recommended the selection of priority areas using indicators, but it also 
required coordination with local government and community request.  
In practice, the communities’ selection procedure used an approach that was more appropriate for 
the local context. The district government decided to allocate an equal number of boreholes in each 
Administrative Post (10 per post): post consultative councils were in charge of selecting villages in 
each post. The councils’ minutes included a report on this initial consultation. The decision was based 
on local knowledge and perceptions concerning water shortage either because of the lack of 
equipment or the level of salinity of existing water points. This selection procedure matched the 
community’s preference for equity that tends to favor a “blanket approach” i.e. equal access to an 
intervention on one hand, while allowing some room to favor interventions in specific well-defined 
targeted populations (in this case villages that lacked water) (Ducrot, 2013). 
Yet in many communities, particularly in Mabalane Administrative Post, it proved difficult to find 
water at depths of less than 100 m or non-saline water, even when the technicians decided not to 
stick to the national salinity threshold. In some cases, the three locations selected by communities 
were useless because no water could be found, either because of groundwater depth or because 
salinity was too high. If possible, the drilling firm would then explore other sites, some of which were 
refused by the community for different reasons, for example, the site was too far from the village, 
subject to flooding, or in the middle of a main access route. In some sites, water proved to be above 
the acceptable threshold and the borehole was not equipped.  
Technicians acknowledged that small reservoirs combined with small water systems were probably 
better suited to the local situation than boreholes. But, logically, they focused on completing the 
exisiting contract rather than pushing for an uncertain technical review of the program. They were all 
the more anxious to finalize the contract because a project for the construction of reservoirs and 20 
cisterns in the district had been cancelled in 2012. In their opinion, the PRONASAR intervention was a 
unique opportunity to drill a large number of boreholes in the context of a severe water crisis. This 
matched the drilling contractor’s desire to complete the contract, as he was paid on the basis of 
equipped boreholes.   
It was thus necessary to change the drilling sites. Communities or councils were not consulted at this 
stage and the decision to change a site was a technical decision involving at the most SDPI, district 
government and the contractors (in particular the supervisor). But it is unclear to what extent the 
decision was a collective one: information we collected in interviews underlined the fact that the 
efficient Chinese firm was pushing to get the district government to provide new drilling sites as 
rapidly as possible so the firm could complete their contract as rapidly as possible.  Villages where 
the  likelihood of failure was higher may have been purposely or indirectly left aside. Our field visits 
revealed that in some villages, only one site had been explored (instead of three sites, as specified) 
and that the contractor would never come back for further investigation as he had told the villagers 
he would. Whereas some distant villages were only visited once by the contractor once, closer 
villages were visited several times sometimes until a satisfactory site was found, but it was not clear 
to us whether district technicians and the local government were involved in the decision. The few 
villages whose leaders had submitted a formal complaint to the district service were also more likely 
to be visited again. In any case, many villages were not informed that they had been selected and 
consequently did not have time to reach agreement on possible sites. This occasionally led to more 
disagreement concerning selection of a site. For example, in Combomune-Estação, one borehole was 
drilled in a private plot without consulting the absent landowner, with the risk of privatization of the 
borehole.   
As the end of the contract end approached, technicians and the district government decided to focus 
on the plateau area of the Combumune AP, where non saline groundwater had proved easier to 
access. The consultative councils were not involved in this second selection phase and some of their 
members were very critical of the sites or technologies selected: the program had opened space to 
test alternative hand pumps “suitable for varying depths and water quality”. But this was decided 
contractually and thus inflexible. The Mabalane contract specified that five of the 30 boreholes 
should be equipped with an Afripump type of pump. These pumps proved to be unsuitable for local 
situations: in Combumume-Estação four women would be needed to make the pump work because 
of its great depth. Although the number of boreholes in the Vila had increased, the population 
resented the situation. This mode of decision making also hampered the mobilization of the 
communities and jeopardized the second dimension of the program, which dealt with sanitation, as 
sanitation was considered by most communities to be of little importance and was only accepted as a 
way of obtaining access to water .  
Finally, although the formal program requirements were respected, such as the need for a letter of 
request from the community formalizing their involvement in SWI maintenance, most of the request 
letters were regularized after drilling was completed. What had been considered as a key condition 
for local sustainability turned out to be a mere administrative and bureaucratic formality.   
Relationships within the communities around the newly drilled boreholes  
As part of the focus on restructuring the maintenance model, the PRONASAR program encouraged 
the creation of water committees. The PRONASAR document emphasizes two aspects:  a 
participatory approach to mobilize the community and create a maintenance structure at the village 
level, and the training of the newly formed or “re-dynamized” water committee.  
In the villages we visited, the community responsibility for SWI management and maintenance was 
never challenged and maintenance was generally considered to be a local problem. All the villages 
that had an operational water point had a water committee, although membership did not follow a 
specific pattern. The discourse of the PEC contractor focused on the adaptation of governance to the 
situation of the community, but in practice the contractor imposed a particular model. This model 
focused on the structure of the water committee – that is, providing a list of names of people to fulfil 
the different functions - under the assumption that a fully staffed committee would reduce the risk 
of money being mismanaged. Only the monthly water fee options were discussed, even if recent 
studies have shown that there is no relation between maintenance and the type of contribution 
(Batchelor, McKemey, & Scott, 2000).    
Yet our survey of households in three villages did not reveal any major transparency issues. Even if 
problems of transparency and conflict concerning the management of water fees were mentioned in 
a couple of other villages,  87% of the people we interviewed knew how the money was used and 84% 
approved its use.  When conflicts were mentioned in the other villages, they were mostly linked to 
other internal village conflicts.  An inspection of the accounts book in one village, and the household 
survey showed that between 55 and 60% of villagers pay their water fees on time. Proportionally, the 
poorest households paid much later than the other households: “social water tariffs” made sense in 
the village context. They had been introduced in some villages by the NGOs who drilled the first 
boreholes, but, although included on paper in the PRONASAR program, this possibility had not been 
discussed with the population in any of the villages we visited. In fact, it appears that none of the 
pro-poor clauses of the PRONASAR program have been explicitly implemented:  the technicians told 
us that there had been no mention of this aspect during their training, in contrast to gender aspects, 
for example.  
The survey revealed that the role of the water committee was  not clear to the villagers:  38% of the 
respondents believed that the committee was in charge of managing the borehole, whereas 28% of 
respondents thought it was the community leader, and 38% thought it was someone else (the 
mechanics or treasurer for example).  But when something went wrong in the borehole, 72% would 
report the problem to members of the water committee and 25% to another person in the 
community (not the leader), and 4% did not know to whom to report the problem.  Forty three 
percent told us they had learnt about how the water fees were used at committee meetings, 28% at 
village meetings, and 33% by other means. These statistics underline the limited role played by the 
water committee. If the borehole had a minor problem, the person in charge of maintenance will go 
and try to fix it on his own, if informed. If the necessary spare part is not available locally, the 
restricted water committee (the people in charge of maintenance, treasurer, secretary, and 
president) has to be called on to provide the necessary funds (from the borehole maintenance funds 
coming from water fees). If not actually involved in the decision, the leader was generally informed. 
If not enough money was available, the leader was in charge of calling a village meeting where a 
supplementary contribution would be requested. Only the village leader had the right to enforce 
collective work (for example the work needed to protect the borehole), impose restrictions (e.g. 
locking the borehole until protection is complete) or collect supplementary funds. Consequently, the 
satisfactory functioning of the borehole depended more on the commitment of a few key people 
(the mechanic and/or secretary and sometimes the president who managed the funds) than on 
standard recommendations concerning the functioning of the water committee.  
Responsibilities and decision making varied in each village depending on the relationships between 
the different leaders, including their age, family ties, and the historical background. There were quite 
complex arrangements between inherited (traditional) leadership and elected leaders as well the 
respective leaders’ advisors and the ad hoc committees (water committee, irrigation committee, 
hygiene committee etc.)  created by external intervention; members  of the water committee - like 
those of all the ad hoc committees - were usually nominated by leaders, not elected. They tended to 
be selected among the inner circle of the leaders’ “advisers” (Indunas, advisers, party members, 
block chief) but not always. In practice, depending on the village concerned, the borders between the 
different responsibilities were blurred, one person could hold different titles or the title was mixed. 
Leaders played a key role as intermediaries between the community and the outside “world”. They 
were in charge of disseminating (official) information, for example information concerning external 
interventions. The information we collected in focus groups and individual interviews revealed that 
project/program information was often circulated only within the first circle of committee members 
and leaders’ advisers and not beyond, but this depended on the village, on the leader, and on the 
type of intervention concerned. Actions that had economic potential were particularly at risk of not 
being well disseminated compared to public service interventions like the development of water 
points. And while some leaders were accountable to their community and trusted, many acted as 
gate-keepers and were  little trusted and even distrusted. This explained why narratives concerning 
water conflicts were often connected to other village conflicts and previous interventions.   
 
Discussion  
Despite the fact the program had more than one objective, at district level, the main attraction was 
the increase in the number of boreholes. Although monitoring and evaluation emphasized other 
indicators, in practice, monitoring focused on quantitative indicators for implementation outputs, a 
classic shortcoming of project implementation (Lockwood & Smits, 2011). But technical efficiency 
was associated with an implementation process that was characterized by lack of communication, 
and little attention was paid to governance at local level even though a specific contract was devoted 
to this aspect.   
This gap was all the more important because the governance model promoted by the PEC contract 
was based on assumptions that did not match how the communities actually function. The 
coordination between leadership(s), the key committee members, and the village governance level 
appears to us to be more important for SWI sustainability than the correct functioning of the 
committee. Only leaders are able to mobilize the community to collect complementary funds when 
such funds are needed.  Thus the centrality of leadership for collective action appears to prevail over 
the ‘Western’ concept of self-help and organization (Cammack, 2012). The importance of leadership 
for reliable water delivery in rural water supply schemes has recently been underlined (Mesa, 
Tamekawa, Ezbakhe, Cuadrado, & Chan, 2014).  Trust in the leadership and internal community 
politics are directly impacted by poorly community based intervention (Kamoto, Clarkson, Dorward, 
& Shepherd, 2013). Any intervention that weakened cohesiveness, for example, an intervention 
lacking transparency, or that reached only a very small number of villagers, amplified existing 
tensions, weakened coordination processes and the capacity for collective action and is consequently 
likely to influence SWI sustainability.  This underlines the need to link water interventions with other 
programs.   
Generally speaking, the ‘consultative councils’ were underused during the intervention. Although 
their participatory functioning is more limited than expected due to cooptation and elite capture, 
these councils are the closest form to democratic involvement in district management (Tvedten, 
Paulo, & Rosário, 2010). A better use of these councils during the elaboration and implementation 
phase of projects of this type could probably help to adapt it to district local specificities. In any case, 
it would have helped throw light on local points of view and local knowledge about key issues such as 
salinity, technological and local equity preferences. The main actors involved in the implementation 
had different views on equity perspectives: The high level technician emphasized a targeted support 
to the most vulnerable as proposed by the program but such an approach would have required using 
a complex method to identify the specific targets that was not implemented.  On the other hand, 
technicians emphasized the need to give priority to those who could make the most of the 
intervention, in other words, where the expected results could be most easily achieved. The villagers 
themselves stressed the importance of equal access to public services and public intervention. 
Contractors, notably drilling contractors focused on technical efficiency. As the local councils were 
made up of politicians, technicians, and civil society represented by local elites, they could have been 
the place where the different concepts of equity were discussed so that acceptable solutions to 
allocate sparse resources can be found. They could also have been used to collectively decide on 
appropriate indicators. Indeed as a political arena, the consultative council will remain a place where 
power is expressed. But they will only gain stength and significance, and learn to fully carry out their 
role if they are given a real opportunity to participate in decision making processes that deal with 
their attribution.  
Recent findings show that efficient solutions for the management of public goods are often ‘practical 
hybrids’ resulting from  conscious efforts by elements of the modern state to adapt to local 
preferences and  ways of doing things  (Booth, 2012). They also emphasize that ‘bottom-up pressures 
to perform have little impact in the absence of politically-driven policy coherence and top-down 
discipline’’ as a way to ensure the functioning of technical services go beyond the capture of aid and 
program rent and foster impact on the ground. In this perspective, consultative councils should not 
be viewed as the expression of citizens’ bottom up demands but as a place where the top-down logic 
of Mozambican government can be confronted with local ways of doing things in order to build a 
response that is suited to local conditions.   
The program functioning appears to have reinforced the dependence of the district technical services 
on the provincial administration. Although hierarchical functioning is not necessarily negative, it must 
leave space for coordination processes and for the crafting of local arrangements that fit local 
situations. Coordination between district technical services could clearly be improved. Another 
conclusion was that innovative  ways of adapting to local situations and challenges were stalled and 
sometimes not even brought to the attention of provincial or national bodies. For example, when the 
local business community pointed to its inability to store a large number of spare parts for the water 
supply system, district technicians proposed that a FDD project including spare parts could be 
envisaged. But this proposal failed to go any further. The argument used  was that FDD funds were 
devoted to agricultural projects. An opportunity to better articulate different policies for district 
development was clearly missed here.    
Conclusion  
In rural water supply schemes, the reliability and continuity of the service remains the main 
challenge as is true in the semi-arid area of northern Gaza province, adding to the challenge of 
extending water access in a context of difficult hydrogeological conditions. It is now widely 
acknowledged that this is more a governance issue than a technical one. This means that actors’ 
interactions, social functioning and “politic from below” play a key role in the effective outcomes of 
SWI development.  Even in a hydrogeological context that severely constrains drilling outcomes, the 
spatial distribution of water points resulted from compromise that had more to do with actors 
relationships during program implementation than with the strategic orientation of the program. The 
hierarchical functioning of the district government, the agendas and strategies of state agents or 
contractors contributed as much to the final allocation of water points as groundwater depth or 
salinity. The tensions and frustration that prevailed during the implementation phase should not be 
overlooked as they erode community social capital and may lead to unexpected difficulties in future 
interventions.  Thus technical and economic efficiency needs to be balanced with social functioning 
and local politics. This underlines the need to supplement the set of existing monitoring indicators 
with indicators that assess how local institutions are accounted for.  
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